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Ahstract-The rapid development of online social networks 
(OSN) makes viral marketing through the word-of-mouth effect 
possible. Designing effective marketing strategy is critical in 
monetizing the social networks. However, most existing studies 
focus on conducting effective influence maximization analysis to 
propagate information widely instead of explicitly incorporating 
the pricing factor to design intelligent marketing strategies. In 
this paper, we study the sequential pricing models in which a 
monopoly seller iteratively posts a sequence of public unique 
prices for a product in stages, and any interested buyer can 
buy the product at the posted price at a particular stage if 
his valuation is above the posted price. Specifically, our model 
is built on the multi-state diffusion scheme where an active 
user may be in the "AWARE" and "ADOPT" states. Users in 
"ADOPT" state could influence their neighbors' valuation for 
the given product. To realize the goal of revenue maximization, 
we develop a Dynamic Programming Based Heuristic (DPBH) to 
obtain the optimal pricing sequence. Application of the DPBH 
in the revenue maximization problem shows that it performs 
well in both the expected revenue achieved and in running time. 
This leads to fundamental ramifications to many related OSN 
marketing applications. 
Keywords-Pricing, Revenue Maximization, Marketing, Mone­
tizing Online Social Network. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
With the rapid development of online social networks 
(OSN) such as Facebook, Twitter and Google+, large-scale, in­
stantaneous information dissemination becomes possible. This 
offers the potential for a surge of innovations and opportunities 
in social advertising and viral marketing [1]. However, most 
of the existing studies focus on conducting effective influ­
ence maximization analysis to propagate information widely 
instead of explicitly incorporating the pricing factor to design 
intelligent marketing strategies. In other words, extracting the 
economic value of social networks is still lacking [2]. Suppose 
a seller wants to sell a digital product via a social network, with 
intelligent selling strategies, i.e., pricing schemes, the revenue 
could be maximized. This is one way to monetize the social 
network, and is the research problem we will address in this 
paper. 
There is a series of studies on viral marketing in the context 
of social networks. Domingos [3] and Richardson [4] are 
the first to formulate this as an algorithmic problem. They 
studied how to effectively promote a new technology or a 
new idea in an OSN by targeting a group of influential users. 
The seminal paper by Kempe et al. [5] then reformulated 
the problem further as "influence maximization" (INFMAX) 
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utilizing discrete optimization theory. Given a social graph, 
and a positive number k, INFMAX is defined as finding a 
seed-set of k nodes such that by targeting them initially, the 
viral spread is maximized. 
While the INFMAX problem has been studied intensively, 
especially in the spreading of information and free products, it 
does not discuss the dependence of adoption on price. In eco­
nomics, the pricing factor has been considered fully. However, 
the network effects are always addressed in a global or macro 
view. A recent stream of literature in computer science starts to 
study the "Revenue Maximization" (REVMAX) problem over 
social networks. The pioneering work by Hartline et al. [6] 
and Dismitris et al. [7] studied optimal marketing for digital 
goods in OSNs and proposed the "Influence and Exploit" (IE) 
strategy. In IE, seed nodes are offered products free of charge, 
and then the seller could approach other users individually to 
offer specific prices. However, price discrimination, although 
useful for revenue maximization in some settings, may result 
in negative reactions from buyers. For example Oliver and 
Shor [8] [9] suggest that price discrimination could reduce 
the likelihood of purchasing. Moreover, it is impractical for 
sellers to adjust prices too frequently. Hence, we will refor­
mulate the REVMAX problem such that price discrimination 
is prohibited. 
While many studies have been conducted on REVMAX, 
most existing work does not distinguish the different types 
of active node states by simply assuming that active nodes 
will definitely adopt the given product. Researchers from 
different disciplines have demonstrated the differences between 
awareness and adoption. In sociology, Rogers (1962) [10] 
proposed five stages of product adoption including knowledge, 
persuasion, decision, implementation, and confirmation. Be­
sides, in management science, Kalish [II] also characterized 
the adoption of a new product as consisting of two stages, 
namely, awareness and adoption. In computer science, simu­
lations using real world data sets [12] also show that diffusion 
models which utilize "influenced state" and "adoption state" 
to depict "active" could reflect reality well. In particular, 
[13] proposed a profit maximization algorithm under multi­
state diffusion settings. However, they still follow the "IE" 
framework, i.e., price discrimination still exists. Moreover, in 
their work sequential pricing scheme is not addressed. 
To address the aforementioned limitations, we propose to 
study the problem of revenue maximization over online social 
networks, by incorporating a multi-state diffusion scheme. In 
particular, we investigate marketing strategies to maximize 
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TABLE I. NOTATIONS 
Notation Description 
N'i 
X,(t) 
X,(t) 
Y,(t) 
Ye( t) 
Z, (t) 
Ze(t) 
A(t) 
Set of u/ s friends. 
Initial set of users in ADOPT state at the beginning of pricing stage t 
Final set of users in ADOPT state at the end of pricing stage t 
Initial set of users in AWARE state at the beginning of pricing stage t 
Final set of users in AWARE state at the end of pricing stage t 
Initial set of users in INACTIVE state at the beginning of pricing stage t 
Final set of users in INACTIVE state at the end of pricing stage t 
Likelihood that any user is exposed to the external advertising 
p, 
K 
at pricing stage t 
Posted price of the given product at pricing stage t 
Total number of pricing stages 
Wi. (Xi. (t)) User u;,' s valuation of the product, and it depends on the users 
who already own the product, IX,(t)1 :S IX (t)1 :S IXe(t)1 
revenue of durable digital goods, where the cost of producing 
a copy of the goods is negligible and a customer is only 
interested in buying a single copy, By designing an optimal 
sequential pricing policy based on dynamic programming, the 
maximum revenue could be achieved within reasonable time. 
Our contributions could be summarized as follows. 
• We propose a multi-state diffusion scheme by in­
corporating both the awareness propagation and the 
adoption diffusion. Here the awareness information 
is determined by social network effects and external 
influence (like mass media effects), while the actual 
adoption depends on the product price information 
and buyer's valuation of the product. 
• We formally formulate the sequential pricing problem 
over OSN with a multi-state diffusion scheme. Given 
K possible stages, we determine a price vector p 
with K sequential prices to maximize the revenue. 
Recently, Akhlaghpour et al. [14] also studied the 
iterative pricing problem, but they did not consider 
the comprehensive diffusion process. 
• We design an optimal pricing algorithm for any given 
K via dynamic programming. 
• We conduct experiments using two real world datasets 
to evaluate our proposed algorithm. Experimental re­
sults show that the algorithm performs well in the 
expected revenue achieved and in running time. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II 
discusses the proposed framework including the multi-state 
diffusion scheme and the REVMAX problem formulation. 
Section III presents our pricing strategies. Experiments are 
discussed in Section IV. Section V provides conclusions and 
future work. 
II. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK 
In this section we will firstly introduce the proposed multi­
state diffusion model (MSDM) and then formally formulate the 
REVMAX problem. The notations are shown in Table I. 
A. Diffusion Model 
In this part, we introduce our multi-state diffusion scheme. 
The social graph can be represented in the form of a directed 
graph G = (V, E) , where V = {Ul' U2, ... , UN} is the set 
of nodes (users), and Ui is the unique ID of User i, E = 
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I W,(x,) < p 
I B,(X, Y,Z) I I W,(X,) ? p 
INACTIVE ADOPT 
II-B,(X, Y,Z) I 
Fig. I. The State Transition Diagram 
0 Potential adopter 
e External influence 
• Acti ve neighbors 
@ Aware neighbors 
(3 Inactive neighbors 
Fig. 2. The Awareness Diffusion 
{ {U, V} Iu, V E V} is the set of edges. Each user belongs to one 
of three states: INACTIVE (User is not aware of the product), 
AWARE (User is aware or develops some interest about the 
product), and ADOPT (User decides to adopt the product). The 
state transition diagram is shown in Fig. I. Here, 9i(X, Y, Z) 
is the influence function for Ui, and it dictates u/ s awareness 
decision. Wi (Xi (t))) is Ui I S valuation function, and it depends 
on the set of u/ s friends who has already bought the product. 
Here, we assume that the users in our system are fully aware of 
their friends' state information. More details will be specified 
in the following subsections. 
1) Awareness Diffusion: Inactive nodes become AWARE 
due to word-of-mouth effect or advertising. Thus the likeli­
hood of becoming AWARE is proportional to the number of 
"transmitters" in the social network (i.e. X(t), Y (t), Z(t) and 
the exogenous advertising effects (i.e. A( t) .  See Table I for the 
notations. Fig. 2 shows how different types of users influence 
the target user. 
For a given user Ui, the awareness diffusion probability 
equation is shown as follows. 
9.(X Y Z) = A(t) +aI
Xi(t)1 +f3IYi(t)1 +)Zi(t)1 (1) 
, 
, , 
. INil INil I INil 
IXi(t)1 = IX(t) n Nil (2) 
IYi(t)1 = IY (t) n Nil (3) 
IZi(t)1 = IZ(t) n Nil (4) 
This awareness equation says that, an inactive user ui will 
become AWARE with probability 9i(X, Y, Z), and remains 
INACTIVE with probability 1 - 9i(X, Y, Z). A(t) is the 
external influence, and other terms represent the influence 
exerted by the neighbors of Ui. Here, we make a close-world 
assumption that adopters transmit information more effectively 
than AWARE individuals, i.e., a > (3 > 0, and INACTIVE 
nodes do not have influential power, i.e., I = O. 
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2) Adoption Diffusion: This section introduces the 
adoption diffusion scheme. Due to personal differences or 
human diversities, different people will value the same product 
differently. For example, the income, personal interests and 
actual needs will affect the adoption process. Existing 
literature [15] uses the term "reservation prices" to represent 
user valuation. A reservation price is the maximum amount 
a customer would be willing to pay given current available 
information. If the actual price is below the individual's 
reservation price, he will buy; otherwise, he will not. As more 
users adopt the product, the valuation of the product increases. 
At stage t, Wi (Xi (t)) represents U/ o5 valuation of the product. 
(5) 
Note that Ii represents U/ o5 intrinsic value in buying certain 
products and \If i (Xi (t)) is purely detennined by the set Xi (t). 
So we have \lfi(0) = 0, Wi(0) = h It means that even if no 
friends of Ui buy the given product, U/ o5 valuation is still not 
zero, since a customer may have certain intrinsic value for a 
given product. 
If the current announced price is Pt, Ui will adopt the given 
product under the condition that Wi(Xi(t))�Pt. Here, we 
make the assumption that the seller does not know the buyer's 
exact valuation, but it does know the distribution F(W) from 
which the valuation is drawn. Moreover, we assume that users 
have positive externalities on each other, i.e., for two subsets, 
S, T � V, if S � T � V, then Wi(S) :::; Wi(T). 
3) Diffusion Dynamics with Sequential Pricing: Instead 
of just publishing one unique price at all times, we allow 
the seller to post K public prices sequentially to promote 
the given product. Each pricing stage ends when no more 
buyers are willing to buy the product at the current price. 
Then the seller has to lower the price to the current maximum 
valuation among the AWARE nodes, and start the next pricing 
stage. The K-stage sequential pricing process ends if either of 
the following two conditions occurs: 1) The price has been 
posted for K stages; 2) The number of nodes in AWARE 
state is O. Obviously, following the proposed diffusion 
framework, the sequence of prices should be decreasing. The 
diffusion dynamics within a given pricing stage t is as follows. 
• Find Ui, the node with maximum valuation within the 
AWARE set. Set the public posted price for the current 
stage Pt = Wi and set U/ o5 state to ADOPT. 
• Update the states for U/ o5 existing neighbours using 
Algorithm 1 (Node Decision Algorithm). 
• If newly ADOPT nodes or AWARE nodes are found, 
continue the diffusion process. 
• The current pricing stage t ends if no more state 
transition is possible. 
B. Problem Formulation 
In this part we formulate the Revenue Maximization Prob­
lem. Suppose there is a seller and a set V of potential buyers 
connected as in graph G = (V, E). The seller could post a 
public price which is visible to all nodes in an iterative way. 
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Algorithm 1 Node Decision Algorithm 
INPUT ui 8 current state o5i, current price Pt 
if o5i is INACTIVE then 
Ui becomes AWARE with probability gi 
if SUCCESS then 
if Wi > Pt then 
set o5i to ADOPT 
else 
set o5i to AWARE 
end if 
end if 
else if o5i is AWARE then 
if Wi > Pt then 
set o5i to ADOPT 
end if 
else 
add Ui to ADOPT nodes queue 
end if 
When the buyer accepts the offered price, i.e., the price of the 
product is smaller than the buyer's valuation, the seller earns 
the price of the product as the revenue. Suppose the price at 
stage t is Pt, and the corresponding number of buyers is Bt, 
then the system revenue at pricing stage t, i.e., Rt, will be: 
R(t) = Pt x Bt (6) 
Consider that in the whole marketing period, the sys­
tem could post at most K different prices, i.e., there are 
K pricing stages. Then our goal is to find a price vector 
P = {PI, P2, ... , P K} of K prices to maximize the cumulative 
revenue 2:0<t<::K R(pt), then the optimal pricing sequence is: 
p = argmax "'"' R(t) = argmax "'"' PtBt (7) �O<t<::K �O<t<::K 
This is defined as the REVMAX(K) problem. 
III. METHODOLOGY 
In this section, we first study a restricted case of the 
REVMAX(K) problem, and show that we can identify the 
optimal pricing strategy based on a simple dynamic program­
ming approach. For the general case, due to the complexity 
of the problem it is hard to find an optimal solution. Hence 
we propose a Dynamic Programming Based Heuristic (DPBH) 
to achieve a good approximation for REVMAX(K) within 
polynomial time. 
A. A Special Case of REVMAX(K) 
To better understand the properties of REVMAX(K), we 
first study a special case of the problem. We assume that 
a user's valuation of the given product is deterministic, i.e., 
for each Ui, we have Wi(X) = Wi. For simplicity, the 
awareness diffusion probability gi (X, Y, Z) is generated before 
the diffusion starts. Under this setting, we generate a pricing 
vector p = {PI, P2, ... , PT}, PI > P2··· > PT following the 
greedy algorithm (Algorithm 2). Here, T is the total number 
of pricing stages required to get all potential users to adopt. 
The system revenue here is calculated as 
revenue = PIXP1 + P2XPIP2 + ... + PTXPIP2 .. PT (8) 
Globecom 2013 - Symposium on Selected Areas in Communications 
Algorithm 2 Pricing Sequence Generation 
Set t=I, then Pt = max(Wi), for each Ui in V 
Add Pt to vector p 
update node states in node set V according to Algorithm I 
t = t+I 
while AWARE node set is not empty do 
set Pt = max(Wi), for each Ui in AWARE set 
add Pt to vector p 
update node states in node set V 
end while 
return vector p 
Here, XPIP2",PT is the number of adopters who adopt the 
item at Stage T when the price is Pj at stage j, j <::: T. Let 
XPT be the number of adopters who bought the item when 
only one pricing stage is allowed in which the public price is 
set to be PT. Thus XP1 + XP1P2 + ... + XpIP2 ... PT = XpT, 
which means that XpIP2 ... PT = Xp./, - XpT_1' 
Then the REVMAX(K) problem is to find a decreasing 
sequence of K prices from the vector p to maximize the 
revenue. In computer science, "A problem exhibits optimal 
substructure if an optimal solution to the problem contains 
optimal solutions to the sub-problems." [16]. The optimal 
substructure of REVMAX(K) is as follows: 
R[K,p] = max {R[K - 1,p'] + p'(Xp' - Xp)} (9) O<p'<p 
where R[K,p] represents the maximum revenue achieved 
when the number of pricing stages is K and the maximum 
price is p. Then REVMAX(K) under the restricted setting may 
be solved using dynamic programming. 
B. The General Case of REVMAX(K) 
Now we consider the general REVMAX(K) problem. 
While it is difficult to get an optimal solution, using heuristics, 
we could get a polynomial time approximation regardless of 
the specific form of the valuation distribution. Our proposed 
Dynamic Programming Based Heuristics (DPBH) consists of 
the following four steps: 
• Specify the price bounds Pmin and Pmax, ensuring 
that the optimal pricing sequence p = {P1, P2, ... , P K } 
satisfies Pi E [Pmin, Pmax], i = 1,2, ... , K. 
• Construct candidate price set using Algorithm 3. 
• Simulate the diffusion process for sufficient runs to 
get the expected buyer number for all prices within 
the candidate price set. 
• Use dynamic programming to choose the optimal 
pricing sequence based on the optimal substructure: 
R[K,p] = max {R[K -l,p']+p'(Xp'-Xp)} (10) O<p'<p 
Let the size of the candidate price vector generated by 
Algorithm 3 be Ai[. Ai[ = IIOg;;F l' and the computational 
complexity of our proposed DPBH is KM = K Ilog;�'Fl 
where K is the number of pricing stages. 
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Algorithm 3 Candidate Price Set Construction 
set imin = llogf+�' J, imax = Ilogf+�x l 
for i = imin to imax do 
Pi = (1 + E)(imax+imin-i) 
end for 
return p 
TABLE II. STATISTICS OF THE TWO REAL-WORLD NETWORKS 
Dataset arXiv HEP-PH DBLP community 
Nodes 11,204 1,772 
Edges 235,238 14,984 
Graph density 0.0019 0.0048 
Now we discuss the performance of the proposed heuris­
tic. Considering that both the awareness diffusion and user 
valuation function are probabilistic, the adopt number Xp and 
valuation function Wi(X) are all random variables. Then our 
goal is to maximize the expected revenue E[revenue(K)] with 
K pricing stages. By simulating the diffusion process for a 
polynomial number of trials, we could use the average adoption 
number as an estimation of the expected adopt number. 
Given the estimated optimal sequence obtained from our 
proposed DPBH as Pdp = [Pdp1,Pdp2, ""PdpK], then the 
corresponding estimated achievable maximum revenue is 
revenue(K) = Pdp1XPdPl + 
Pdp2(XPdr>2 - X;:;:) + ... + 
PdpK(XpdPK - XPdP(K_l») 
Meanwhile, the theoretical optimal revenue is: 
E[revenue(K)] = PoptlE[XpoPtl]+ 
(11) 
Popt2(E[XpoPt2] - E[XpoPtl]) + ... + (12) 
PoptK(E[XpOPtK] - E[XpOP1(K_l)]) 
Under certain conditions, in which the random variable 
Xp is i.i.d, then the maximum revenue generated by 
the DPBH, revenue(K), can provide a performance 
guarantee within a factor of (1
1;0
0
)2 of the optimal revenue, 
E[revenue(K)]. The sketch of the proof is as follows. 
Since Xp is i.i.d and 0 <::: Xp <::: lVI, using Chernoff­
Hoeffding theorem, we can show that with high probability 
(1 - E)E[Xp] <::: Xp <::: (1 + E)E[Xp]. Suppose Ui buys 
the product at price (1 + Ey < Popt < (1 + Ey+1 in the 
optimal solution, then Ui will buy the product when the price 
is (1 + EY in our solution, and we have (1 + EY > �. 
Combining the above approximations of the adopt number 
and the candidate price set construction, we show that the 
maximum revenue achieved using our heuristic is within 
1 0 f h . (1;0 )2 0 t e optImum. 
IV. EXPERIMENTS 
A. Experimental Setup 
Dataset. We use two real-world networks of different graph 
densities in our experiments. The first dataset, arXiv HEP­
PH (High Energy Physics - Phenomenology) collaboration 
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Fig. 3. Experimental Results 
network, is from the e-print arXiv and covers scientific collab­
orations submitted to HEP-PH category. The edges represent 
the collaboration relationships between authors. Here we use 
the largest connected component of the arXiv HEP-PH dataset. 
The second graph, the DBLP computer science bibliography 
provides a comprehensive list of research papers in computer 
science. Here we just focus on one comparatively denser 
community of the DBLP graph. The statistics for both graphs 
are shown in Table II. Here, the edges are directed, so the 
density metric is calculated as IEI/(IVI(IVI - 1)). 
Algorithms. Here we compare our proposed DPBH with the 
baseline random algorithm which chooses the pricing sequence 
randomly. For each given input, 1000 simulation runs are 
used to obtain an accurate estimate of the adoption spread. 
For all buyers, we adopt Gaussian distribution and Uniform 
distribution to model user's valuation behaviour. The Gaussian 
distribution has been justified using real datasets and utilized in 
existing papers [13] [17]. For unfamiliar products, the Uniform 
distribution is used to account for lack of knowledge [18] [19]. 
B. Experimental Results 
In this section we show the experimental results of four 
metrics. To save space, we use Fig 3 to illustrate the first three 
metrics. 
The Optimal Pricing Sequence. Fig. 3(a) and Fig. 3(d) 
show the optimal sequence for K = 50 and K = 100, 
respectively. As shown in both figures, the decreasing trend of 
the price sequence will be affected by the valuation function. 
For the Uniform distribution, it drops linearly. For the Gaussian 
distribution, the trend is comparatively less steep. 
3180 
Revenue vs Number of Pricing Stages. Fig. 3(b) and Fig. 
3(e) study the increase of maximized revenue as the number 
of pricing stages increases, under the Gaussian and Uniform 
distributions, respectively. In both cases, the maximum achiev­
able revenue increases with the increase of pricing stages. 
However, there is an obvious diminishing returns phenomenon, 
i.e., within a limited number of pricing stages (around 20 for 
DPBH, and 30 for the random algorithm), the seller could 
extract almost the same revenue that is achieved by more 
pricing stages. 
Adopt Number vs Number of Pricing Stages. Fig. 3(c) and 
Fig. 3(t) study the increase of adopt number as the number 
of pricing stages increases under the Gaussian and Uniform 
distributions, respectively. The results show that maximized 
influence (adopt number) does not necessarily mean maxi­
mized revenue. Under the Gaussian distribution, the random 
algorithm performs equally well as DPBH for the adopt 
number metric. Under the Uniform distribution, while DPBH 
performs much better than the random algorithm in terms of 
the revenue, the random algorithm outerperforms DPBH in 
terms of the adopt number. 
Graph Density vs Pricing Strategy. Finally, we study how 
the network topology may influence the pricing strategy. Here 
we use two real world networks with different graph densities. 
Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 show how the pricing strategy changes 
under different network structures, for the Gaussian and the 
Uniform distributions, respectively. Here, the DBLP network is 
almost three times denser than the arXiv network. Although the 
magnitudes of the maximum achievable revenue are different 
due to the differences in the network scale, the diminishing 
returns phenomenon still holds for both networks, for both the 
Gaussian and the Uniform distributions. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
We study the problem of revenue maximization over online 
social networks, by incorporating the multi-state diffusion 
scheme. In particular, we investigate marketing strategies to 
maximize the revenue of durable digital goods. By designing 
a sequential optimal pricing algorithm using dynamic pro­
gramming, the maximum achievable revenue could be obtained 
within polynomial time. Moreover, our algorithm could pro­
vide performance guarantee under specific cases. Experimental 
results using real-world datasets demonstrate the effectiveness 
of our proposed heuristic. 
In our current studies, the cost of the product and repeat 
purchase effect are not considered. We will consider these 
issues in our future work. 
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